Measuring Success in Biosafety and Biosecurity
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Sandia National Laboratories' International Biological and Chemical Threat Reduction (SNL/IBCTR) conducted, on behalf of the Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP), a review of risk assessment in modern select agent laboratories. This review and analysis consisted of literature review, interviews of FSAP staff, entities regulated by FSAP, and deliberations of an expert panel. Additionally, SNL/IBCTR reviewed oversight mechanisms used by industries, US agencies, and other countries for high-consequence risks (e.g, nuclear, chemical, or biological materials, aviation, off-shore drilling, etc.) to determine if alternate oversight mechanisms existed that might be applicable to FSAP oversight of biological select agents and toxins. This report contains five findings, based on these reviews and analyses, with recommendations and suggested actions for FSAP to consider.
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Rinderpest is a virus that can affect cattle and other even toes ungulates; evidence of outbreaks from over 10,000 years ago highlights the potential impact of this virus. During the 18th century, Rinderpest caused huge losses in cattle throughout Europe. Starting in the mid 1900’s vaccination efforts seemed feasible and work was initiated to vaccinate large populations of cattle. Walter Plowright received numerous awards for updating the Rinderpest vaccine which many believed would be the key to eradication. Vaccination of the disease lead to a massive drop in outbreaks and the last confirmed case of Rinderpest in Asia was in 2000 and in Africa in 2001.1 At this point, Rinderpest has been declared eradicated from nature. However, stocks of the virus are still in many laboratories.2 Rinderpest was investigated as a biological weapon agent during the Second World War. However, following WWII, rinderpest was not considered a high risk as a biological weapon as there was no direct military advantage. Now, with the concern of the use of biological agents as weapons in acts of terrorism, concern regarding rinderpest has resurfaced. Since the eradication of this virus, cattle populations are highly susceptibility to the virus and the economic impacts would be significant. This paper will discuss the specific nature of the terrorism risks associated with rinderpest; and based upon those risks provide recommendations regarding biosecurity management. The biosecurity management measures will be defined in a manner to align with the CWA 15793: the laboratory biorisk management document.
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Monitor i ng in f ectio n s in v ect o rs su c h as m osquit o es, s a nd fl i es, tsetse fl i es, a nd ticks to i denti f y hu m a n path o gens m a y s e r v e as a n ear l y w arn i ng det e ction system t o dir e ct loc a l g o v er n ment dise a se pr e v en t i v e m easu r e s . One major hurdle i n de t ection is the abi l i t y to scre e n l arge n u mbers of v e c t ors for h uman patho g ens w i thout t h e u s e of ge n o t y pe - s p ecific m o lecu l ar tec h nique s . N e x t genera t ion s equ e nc i ng (NG S ) pr o v i des a n unbi a sed p latfo r m capab l e of identi f y i ng k n o w n a n d unk n o w n p ath o ge n s circula t ing w i thin a v e ctor p opul a tion, but utili z ing t h is te c h nolo g y i s tim e - con s u ming a n d cos t l y for v ecto r -b o rne disease su r v e illan c e pr o gra m s. T o addr e s s this w e d e v e lop e d cos t -eff e ct i v e Ilumina(r) R NA- S eq l i bra r y p r epara t ion m e thodol o gies i n con j u n ction w i t h an automa t ed c ompu t at i onal a n a l y sis pipel i n e to ch a racter i ze t h e microbial popula t ions c ircula t i n g in Cu l e x m o squit o e s (Cul e x qui n quef a s c iatu s , C ul e x quinq u efasc i atus / pip i ens co m pl e x h y bri d s, and C u l e x ta r salis ) t hroug h out Californ i a. W e assembled 2 0 n o vel a n d w e l l -do c ume n ted a r b o v i ruses repres e nting mem b e rs of B u n y a v ir i da e , F l a v i virid a e, If a virida e , Meson i v i rida e , Nid o v iri d ae, O rtho m y x o virid a e, Pa r v o v iri d ae, Re o virid a e, R h a b d o v i rid a e, T y m o v iri d ae, a s w ell as s e v e r al u n assi g n e d v irus e s . In addit i o n, w e m app e d mRNA s pecies to d i vergent s peci e s of t r y panos o ma a nd pl a s modium eu k a r yotic parasit e s and cha r a c terized t he p r oka r yot i c microb i al c o mposit i on to i d enti f y bacteri a l tran s c r ipts der i v ed from wolba c hia, clo s tridi u m, m y c oplas m a, fusoba c terium and c am p y l o bacter bac t er i al spec i e s . W e utilized the s e mic r obial transcri p tomes pre s e nt in g e ogra p hical l y defined Cul e x po p ul a tions to defi n e spatial and m osqui t o specie s -spec i fic ba r r iers of i n fecti o n. T he v i r ome and microbi o me c o mpos i tion id e ntified in e ach mosqui t o p o ol pr o v i ded suf f icient resolut i on to dete r m i ne both the mosq u ito species and the g e o graphic regi o n in Californ i a w h e re t h e mosqui t o po o l orig i n ated. T his d a ta pr o v i des ins i ght in t o the compl e x i t y of microb i al spec i es cir c ulati n g in med i cal l y i mport a nt Culex mosqui t oes a nd t h eir potent i al im p act o n t he tran s missi o n of v ector-b o rne human / veter i na r y p a t hogens in C a liforn i a.
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