Publications

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To ensure the peaceful intent for production and processing of nuclear fuel, verifiable process monitoring of the fuel production cycle is required. As part of a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-EURATOM collaboration in the field of international nuclear safeguards, the DOE Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) and Directorate General-Energy (DG-ENER) developed and demonstrated a new concept in process monitoring, enabling the use of operator process information by branching a second, authenticated data stream to the Safeguards inspectorate. This information would be complementary to independent safeguards data, improving the understanding of the plant's operation. The concept is called the Enhanced Data Authentication System (EDAS). EDAS transparently captures, authenticates, and encrypts communication data that is transmitted between operator control computers and connected analytical equipment utilized in nuclear processes controls. The intent is to capture information as close to the sensor point as possible to assure the highest possible confidence in the branched data. Data must be collected transparently by the EDAS: Operator processes should not be altered or disrupted by the insertion of the EDAS as a monitoring system for safeguards. EDAS employs public key authentication providing 'jointly verifiable' data and private key encryption for confidentiality. Timestamps and data source are also added to the collected data for analysis. The core of the system hardware is in a security enclosure with both active and passive tamper indication. Further, the system has the ability to monitor seals or other security devices in close proximity. This paper will discuss the EDAS concept, recent technical developments, intended application philosophy and the planned future progression of this system.

Advanced sealing technologies are often an integral part of a containment surveillance (CS) approach to detect undeclared diversion of nuclear materials. As adversarial capabilities continue to advance, the sophistication of the seal design must advance as well. The intelligent integration of security concepts into a physical technology used to seal monitored items is a fundamental requirement for secure containment. Seals have a broad range of capabilities. These capabilities must be matched appropriately to the application to establish the greatest effectiveness from the seal. However, many current seal designs and their application fail to provide the high confidence of detection and timely notification that can be appreciated with new technology. Additionally, as monitoring needs rapidly expand, out-pacing budgets, remote monitoring of low-cost autonomous sealing technologies becomes increasingly appealing. The Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA) utilizes this technology and has implemented cost effective security concepts establishing the high confidence that is expected of active sealing technology today. RMSA is a system of relatively low-cost but secure active loop seals for the monitoring of nuclear material containers. The sealing mechanism is a fiber optic loop that is pulsed using a low-power LED circuit with a coded signal to verify integrity. Battery life is conserved by the use of sophisticated power management techniques, permitting many years of reliable operation without battery replacement or other maintenance. Individual seals communicate by radio using a secure transmission protocol using either of two specially designated communication frequency bands. Signals are encrypted and authenticated by private key, established during the installation procedure, and the seal bodies feature both active and passive tamper indication. Seals broadcast to a central 'translator' from which information is both stored locally and/or transmitted remotely for review. The system is especially appropriate for nuclear material storage facilities, indoor or outdoor, enabling remote inspection of status rather than tedious individual seal verification, and without the need for interconnected cabling. A handheld seal verifier is also available for an inspector to verify any particular individual seal in close proximity. This paper will discuss the development of the RMSA sealing system, its capabilities, its application philosophy, and projected future trends.

To maintain effective containment surveillance (CS) system capabilities, the requirements for such systems must continue to evolve outpacing diversion capabilities, reduce costs, and meet the needs of the looming nuclear renaissance. What are the future sensor-based capabilities that must be available to support growing CS requirements and what are the technologies needed to provide the underlying capabilities? This presentation is intended to discuss the present gaps in sensor-based containment and surveillance relevant technologies, and future development trends which may address these gaps. Consumer driven technology development will represent a component rich source of technologies and devices that can find application in containment and surveillance tools helping to minimize the technology gaps. Recognizing and utilizing these sources is paramount to cost effective solutions. Where these gaps cannot be addressed by consumer based development, custom, CS specific approaches are the only solution.

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For over a decade, Sandia National Laboratories has collaborated with domestic and international partners in the development of intelligent Radio Frequency (RF) loop seals and sensor technologies for multiple applications. Working with US industry, the International Atomic Energy Agency and Russian institutes; the Sandia team continues to utilize gains in technology performance to develop and deploy increasingly sophisticated platforms. Seals of this type are typically used as item monitors to detect unauthorized actions and malicious attacks in storage and transportation applications. The spectrum of current seal technologies at Sandia National Laboratories ranges from Sandia's initial T-1 design incorporating bi-directional RF communication with a loop seal and tamper indicating components to the highly flexible Secure Sensor Platform (SSP). Sandia National Laboratories is currently pursuing the development of the next generation fiber optic loop seal. This new device is based upon the previously designed multi-mission electronic sensor and communication platform that launched the development of the T-1A which is currently in production at Honeywell FM&T for the Savannah River Site. The T-1A is configured as an active fiber optic seal with authenticated, bi-directional RF communications capable of supporting a number of sensors. The next generation fiber optic loop seal, the Secure Sensor Platform (SSP), is enhancing virtually all of the existing capabilities of the T-1A and is adding many new features and capabilities. The versatility of this new device allows the capabilities to be selected and tailored to best fit the specific application. This paper discusses the capabilities of this new generation fiber optic loop seal as well as the potential application theater which can range from rapid, remotely-monitored, temporary deployments to long-term item storage monitoring supporting International nuclear non-proliferation. This next generation technology suite addresses the combination of sealing requirements with requirements in unique materials' identification, environmental monitoring, and remote long-term secure communications. © 2005 IEEE.

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One of the legacies of the nuclear weapon and nuclear power cycles has been the generation of large quantities of nuclear waste and fissile materials. As citizens of this planet, it is everyone's responsibility to provide for safe, secure, transparent, disposal of these waste nuclear materials. The Sandia Cooperative Monitoring Center sponsored a Transparency Monitoring Workshop where the use of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) was identified as a possible transparency demonstration test bed. Three experiments were conceived as jumpstart activities to showcase the effective use of the WIPP infrastructure as a Transparency Demonstration Test Bed. The three experiments were successfully completed and demonstrated at the International Atomic Energy Association sponsored International Conference on Geological Repositories held in Denver Colorado November 1999. The design and coordination of these efforts is the subject of this paper.