Publications

Walter, Andrew W.

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Wyss, Gregory D.; Otero, Consuelo J.; Walter, Andrew W.; Darby, John

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Walter, Andrew W.

National policymakers are currently considering a dilemma of critical importance to the continued security of the United States: how can U.S. nuclear weapons policies be leveraged to benefit U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals in the near-term, without sacrificing U.S. national security? In its role supporting U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Sandia National Laboratories has a responsibility to provide objective technical advice to support policy deliberations on this question. However, to best fulfill this duty Sandia must have a broader understanding of the context of the problem. To help develop this understanding, this paper analyzes the two predominant analytical perspectives of international relations theory to explore their prescriptions for how nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies interact. As lenses with which to view and make sense of the world, theories of international relations must play a crucial role in framing the trade-offs at the intersection of the nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy domains. An analysis of what these theories suggest as courses of action to leverage nuclear weapons policies to benefit nonproliferation goals is then offered, with particular emphasis on where the policy prescriptions resulting from the respective theories align to offer near-term policy changes with broad theoretical support. These policy prescriptions are then compared to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to understand what the theories indicate policymakers may have gotten right in their dealing with the nuclear dilemma, and where they may have gone wrong. Finally, a brief international relations research agenda is proposed to help address the dilemma between nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation policies, with particular emphasis on how such an agenda can best support the needs of the policy community and a potential 'all things nuclear' policy deliberation and decision-support framework.

Jaeger, Cal; Russell, John L.; Sandoval, Joseph S.; Torres, Teresa M.; Ulibarri, Carla U.; Walter, Andrew W.; Wyss, Gregory D.

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Walter, Andrew W.

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Walter, Andrew W.

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Walter, Andrew W.

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Walter, Andrew W.

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Walter, Andrew W.

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Walter, Andrew W.; Russell, John L.; Atencio, Inez N.; Brooks, Scott H.; Torres, Teresa M.

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Wyss, Gregory D.; Darby, John; Sholander, Peter E.; Walter, Andrew W.

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Darby, John; Phelan, James M.; Sholander, Peter E.; Walter, Andrew W.; Wyss, Gregory D.

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Depoy, Jennifer M.; Phelan, James M.; Sholander, Peter E.; Varnado, G.B.; Wyss, Gregory D.; Darby, John; Walter, Andrew W.

Assessing the risk of malevolent attacks against large-scale critical infrastructures requires modifications to existing methodologies that separately consider physical security and cyber security. This research has developed a risk assessment methodology that explicitly accounts for both physical and cyber security, while preserving the traditional security paradigm of detect, delay, and respond. This methodology also accounts for the condition that a facility may be able to recover from or mitigate the impact of a successful attack before serious consequences occur. The methodology uses evidence-based techniques (which are a generalization of probability theory) to evaluate the security posture of the cyber protection systems. Cyber threats are compared against cyber security posture using a category-based approach nested within a path-based analysis to determine the most vulnerable cyber attack path. The methodology summarizes the impact of a blended cyber/physical adversary attack in a conditional risk estimate where the consequence term is scaled by a ''willingness to pay'' avoidance approach.