The Nonproliferation Mentorship Program at Sandia National Laboratories
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Nuclear power offers the promise of long-term electrical power for remote areas. Recent advances in passive safety and long-life cores make a reactor that can be operated autonomously for 20 years or more a real possibility. This white paper discusses a reactor concept that offers the potential for further development, resulting in a permanently hermetically-sealed "nuclear cartridge." The term "nuclear cartridge" is meant to imply a nuclear energy source that can be inserted into a site and operated autonomously until its energy has been depleted, then withdrawn and replaced by another cartridge. The concept can be scaled for various sizes, ranging from about 1 megawatt-electric (MWe) to about 100 MWe. The paper also discusses the concept of Integrated Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards (ISOSS) by design as it applies to this reactor design. Finally, a discussion of smart grids and how they can benefit the transfer of power to the end user is included. The Nuclear Cartridge concept has been developed with the following characteristics in mind: highly reliable autonomous operation coupled with international monitoring, requiring minimal on-site operations personnel; walkaway passively safe design; cartridge replacement cycle on the order of 20 years; load following capability; physical security by design requiring minimal security personnel during operations; and proliferation resistance by design. As illustrated in figure 1, integrating the reactor with advanced power conversion, smart grids, and other sources of energy results in a resilient and sustainable energy source.
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The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII—pronounced "genie") seeks to develop expertise among future leaders of Gulf-region nuclear power programs in global standards, norms and best practices in nuclear energy programs. More specifically, the institute aims to contribute to the enhancement of nuclear security, safety, and safeguards (the so-called nuclear "3S") by providing an avenue for regional nuclear interaction, technical collaboration, lessons-learned discussions, and best-practices sharing. It is a multidisciplinary human capacity development institute offering education, research and technical services to support responsible nuclear energy programs in the Gulf and Middle East regions. In this Joint Report, Chapter 2 discusses GNEII's origins (including drivers, milestones, and design principles), Chapter 3 discusses GNEII's objectives (including goals, mission, and vision), Chapter 4 discusses GNEII's operations (including education, research, and technical service pillars), Chapter 5 discusses major insights and next steps, and Chapter 6 provides a list of publications offering additional depictions and details of GNEII's evolution. Though only one piece of a multi-faceted, multi-national effort to develop human infrastructure needs for nascent nuclear energy programs, GNEII offers a model that addresses the socio-technical attributes of nuclear 3S that can be replicated globally.
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To support more rigorous analysis on global security issues at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), there is a need to develop realistic data sets without using "real" data or identifying "real" vulnerabilities, hazards or geopolitically embarrassing shortcomings. In response, an interdisciplinary team led by subject matter experts in SNL's Center for Global Security and Cooperation (CGSC) developed a hypothetical case description. This hypothetical case description assigns various attributes related to international SNF transportation that are representative, illustrative and indicative of "real" characteristics of "real" countries. There is no intent to identify any particular country and any similarity with specific real-world events is purely coincidental. To support the goal of this report to provide a case description (and set of scenarios of concern) for international SNF transportation inclusive of as much "real-world" complexity as possible -- without crossing over into politically sensitive or classified information -- this SAND report provides a subject matter expert-validated (and detailed) description of both technical and political influences on the international transportation of spent nuclear fuel.
In response to the expansion of nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) activities -- and the associated suite of risks -- around the world, this project evaluated systems-based solutions for managing such risk complexity in multimodal and multi-jurisdictional international spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation. By better understanding systemic risks in SNF transportation, developing SNF transportation risk assessment frameworks, and evaluating these systems-based risk assessment frameworks, this research illustrated interdependency between safety, security, and safeguards risks is inherent in NFC activities and can go unidentified when each "S" is independently evaluated. Two novel system-theoretic analysis techniques -- dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) and system-theoretic process analysis (STPA) -- provide integrated "3S" analysis to address these interdependencies and the research results suggest a need -- and provide a way -- to reprioritize United States engagement efforts to reduce global nuclear risks. Lastly, this research identifies areas where Sandia National Laboratories can spearhead technical advances to reduce global nuclear dangers.
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ANS IHLRWM 2017 - 16th International High-Level Radioactive Waste Management Conference: Creating a Safe and Secure Energy Future for Generations to Come - Driving Toward Long-Term Storage and Disposal
Transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is expected to increase in the future, as the nuclear fuel infrastructure continues to expand and fuel takeback programs increase in popularity. Analysis of potential risks and threats to SNF shipments is currently performed separately for safety and security. However, as SNF transportation increases, the plausible threats beyond individual categories and the interactions between them become more apparent. A new approach is being developed to integrate safety, security, and safeguards (3S) under a system-theoretic framework and a probabilistic risk framework. At the first stage, a simplified scenario will be implemented using a dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) method. This scenario considers a rail derailment followed by an attack. The consequences of derailment are calculated with RADTRAN, a transportation risk analysis code. The attack scenarios are analyzed with STAGE, a combat simulation model. The consequences of the attack are then calculated with RADTRAN. Note that both accident and attack result in SNF cask damage and a potential release of some fraction of the SNF inventory into the environment. The major purpose of this analysis was to develop the input data for DPRA. Generic PWR and BWR transportation casks were considered. These data were then used to demonstrate the consequences of hypothetical accidents in which the radioactive materials were released into the environment. The SNF inventory is one of the most important inputs into the analysis. Several pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel burnups and discharge times were considered for this proof-of-concept. The inventory was calculated using ORIGEN (point depletion and decay computer code, Oak Ridge National Laboratory) for 3 characteristic burnup values (40, 50, and 60 GWD/MTU) and 4 fuel ages (5, 10, 25 and 50 years after discharge). The major consequences unique to the transportation of SNF for both accident and attack are the results of the dispersion of radionuclides in the environment. The dynamic atmospheric dispersion model in RADTRAN was used to calculate these consequences. The examples of maximum exposed individual (MEI) dose, early mortality and soil contamination are discussed to demonstrate the importance of different factors. At the next stage, the RADTRAN outputs will be converted into a form compatible with the STAGE analysis. As a result, identification of additional risks related to the interaction between characteristics becomes a more straightforward task. In order to present the results of RADTRAN analysis in a framework compatible with the results of the STAGE analysis, the results will be grouped into three categories: • Immediate negative harms •Future benefits that cannot be realized •Additional increases in future risk By describing results within generically applicable categories, the results of safety analysis are able to be placed in context with the risk arising from security events.
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The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII) was established collaboratively by Sandia National Laboratories, Texas A&M University, and the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE’s) Khalifa University of Science, Technology and Research in 2011 to provide a regional mechanism for developing responsible nuclear energy infrastructure. By combining education and research, GNEII helps increase knowledge and expertise about nuclear energy infrastructure—including safety, safeguards, and security—among Gulf and Middle East professionals working in regional nuclear-power programs. GNEII has been recognized by the White House as a major achievement in enhanced science and technology partnerships with the developing world.
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Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), International Border Management Systems (IBMS) Program is working to establish a long-term border security strategy with United States Central Command (CENTCOM). Efforts are being made to synthesize border security capabilities and technologies maintained at the Laboratories, and coordinate with subject matter expertise from both the New Mexico and California offices. The vision for SNL is to provide science and technology support for international projects and engagements on border security.
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Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI) at Texas A&M University are working with Middle East regional partners to set up a nuclear energy safety, safeguards, and security educational institute in the Gulf region. SNL and NSSPI, partnered with the Khalifa University of Science, Technology, and Research (KUSTAR), with suppot from its key nuclear stakeholders, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), and the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), plan to jointly establish the institute in Abu Dhabi. The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII) will be a KUSTAR-associated, credit-granting regional education program providing both classroom instruction and hands-on experience. The ultimate objective is for GNEII to be autonomous - regionally funded and staffed with personnel capable of teaching all GNEII courses five years after its inauguration. This is a strategic effort to indigenize a responsible nuclear energy culture - a culture shaped by an integrated understanding of nuclear safety, safeguards and security - in regional nuclear energy programs. GNEII also promotes international interests in developing a nuclear energy security and safety culture, increases collaboration between the nuclear energy security and safety communities, and helps to enhance global standards for nuclear energy technology in the Middle East.
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI) at Texas A&M University are working with Middle East regional partners to set up a nuclear energy safety, safeguards, and security educational institute in the Gulf region. SNL and NSSPI, partnered with the Khalifa University of Science, Technology, and Research (KUSTAR), with suppot from its key nuclear stakeholders, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), and the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), plan to jointly establish the institute in Abu Dhabi. The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII) will be a KUSTAR-associated, credit-granting regional education program providing both classroom instruction and hands-on experience. The ultimate objective is for GNEII to be autonomous - regionally funded and staffed with personnel capable of teaching all GNEII courses five years after its inauguration. This is a strategic effort to indigenize a responsible nuclear energy culture - a culture shaped by an integrated understanding of nuclear safety, safeguards and security - in regional nuclear energy programs. GNEII also promotes international interests in developing a nuclear energy security and safety culture, increases collaboration between the nuclear energy security and safety communities, and helps to enhance global standards for nuclear energy technology in the Middle East.
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The Department of Defense (DoD) has hundreds of facilities where radioactive materials have been used or are being used, including firing ranges, low-level radioactive waste disposal areas, and areas where past activities have resulted in environmental contamination. Affected sites range in size from a few acres to square miles. Impact to the DoD comes through military base closure and release to the public. It is important that radioactive contaminants are remediated to levels that result in acceptable risk to the public. Remediation requires characterization studies, e.g., sampling and surveys, to define the affected areas, removal actions, and final confirmatory sampling and surveys. Characterization of surface contamination concentrations has historically been performed using extensive soil sampling programs in conjunction with surface radiation surveys conducted with hand-held radiation monitoring equipment. Sampling is required within the suspect affected area and a large buffer area. Surface soil contaminant characterization using soil sampling and hand held monitoring are costly, time consuming, and result in long delays between submission of samples for analysis and obtaining of final results. This project took an existing, proven radiation survey technology that has had limited exposure and improved its capabilities by documenting correlation factors for various detector/radionuclide geometries that commonly occur in field surveys. With this tool, one can perform characterization and final release surveys much more quickly than is currently possible, and have detection limits that are as good as or better than current technology. This paper will discuss the capabilities of a large area plastic scintillation detector used in conjunction with a global positioning system (GPS) to improve site characterization, remediation, and final clearance surveys of the radioactively contaminated site. Survey results can rapidly identify areas that require remediation as well as guide surgical removal of contaminated soil that is above remediation guidelines. Post-remediation surveys can document that final radiological site conditions are within the remedial action limits.
A new sample preparation procedure has been developed for digestion of soil samples for uranium analysis. The technique employs a microwave oven digestion system to digest the sample and to prepare it for separation chemistry and analysis. The method significantly reduces the volume of acids used, eliminates a large fraction of acid vapor emissions, and speeds up the analysis time. The samples are analyzed by four separate techniques: Gamma Spectrometry, Alpha Spectroscopy using the open digestion method, Kinetic Phosphorescence Analysis (KPA) using open digestion, and KPA by Microwave digestion technique. The results for various analytical methods are compared and used to confirm the validity of the new procedure. The details of the preparation technique along with its benefits are discussed.